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Introduction
The Pragmatic Ecologist:
Environmental Protection as a
Jurisdynamic Experience
Jim Chent
Like all other questions, the question of how to promote a flourishing
society [should] be answered as much by experience [as by] theory.
- Daniel A. Farber'
Among his many contributions to the field of environmental
law, Professor Dan Farber is perhaps best known for his
development of a systematically "pragmatic approach to
environmental problems."2 Within the tool kit that Professor
Farber has used to breach the "wall between economics and
ethics,"3 one technique merits especially close examination.
Professor Farber has often stressed the centrality of "learning
strategies" in an environmental enterprise marked not only by a
"high degree of uncertainty" but also by "our rapidly evolving
understanding" of the science underlying environmental
problems and their solutions.4 "In biological terms," after all,
"stasis is death; only growth and change keep the organism
alive."5 Environmental law as an organic entity can scarcely
escape this law of nature.
According to conventional depictions, the common law
system supposedly treats time neither as "a gulf to be bridged"
nor as "a yawning abyss," but rather as a medium "filled with the
t James L. Krusemark Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331, 1347 (1988).
2. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 9 (1999).
3. Id.
4. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience,
27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 806 (1994).
5. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 76 (1996).
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continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which all that is
handed down presents itself to us."6 Colloquial uses of "law" in
other fields, such as Grimm's law,7  the third law of
thermodynamics, or Zipfs law, all treat "laws" as immanent,
enduring principles guiding natural phenomena. These
descriptions of law-both in its literal sense as a system of
governance and in its figurative sense within the language of
science-obscure the role of sudden, even catastrophic change in
legal evolution. Law can never fully insulate itself from the
impact of societal and technological change. Likewise, if law
harbors any hope of sustaining "ideas and aspirations that must
survive more ages than one," the law must respond to upheaval.8
Professor Farber's formula is as succinct as it is accurate:
"Environmental protection is a marathon, not a sprint."9 Law
may well consist of a series of judicially and politically negotiated
equilibria, 10 but any stability is episodic at best and prone to
violent interruption. Professor Farber's larger body of work
openly embraces a dynamic model of legal change that reflects
the "punctuated equilibria" that characterizes biological
evolution.11 Jurisdynamics describes the interplay between legal
6. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 264-65 (Garrett Barden
& John Cumming trans., The Seabury Press 2d ed. 1975) (1960); cf. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 621
(1990) (explaining how our understanding of any text "is conditioned by the
traditions of the world into which we are thrown").
7. See LOUIS HJELMSLEV, LANGUAGE 128-29 (Francis J. Whitfield trans.,
Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1970) (describing how phonological principles such as
Grimm's Law or Verner's Law become so entrenched in a particular language
that they become "law[s] of state" rather than "law[s] of change").
8. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901
(1992); cf U.S. CONST. pmbl. (describing the Constitution as having been
adopted "in Order to.. . secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity"); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) ("This
provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.").
9. FARBER, supra note 2, at 13 ("[M]y goal is not to undermine
environmental values, but to implement them in a way that we can expect to
endure, as opposed to heroic efforts that are likely to fade after a few years.").
10. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme
Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 30
(1994) (arguing that the Court's decisions are best understood as "a complex
amalgam of rule-of-law and substantive values applied selectively").
11. Compare, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 3 ISSUES
IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 11, 6 (2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/artll
(last visited Mar. 6, 2003), with STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB 179-
85 (1980) (describing "the episodic nature of evolutionary change" as
representative of "punctuated equilibria").
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responses to exogenous change and the law's own endogenous
capacity for adaptation.
With any luck, Professor Farber's felicitous term, "eco-
pragmatism," "may come to signify an instrument of decision
making, the way people conceive of cost-benefit analysis."12
Ironically enough for a scholar who has advocated pedestrian
"normal science" over flashes of brilliance, 13 Professor Farber
may have invented the paradigm for the next generation of
environmental law. One would expect no less from a scholar who
issued Eco-pragmatism on the heels of a primer on the first
amendment 14  and who has coauthored casebooks on
constitutional law as well as environmental law. 15 His scholarly
reach has become "so vast that fully to comprehend it would
require an almost universal knowledge ranging from" economics
and the natural sciences "to the niceties of the legislative, judicial
and administrative processes of government." 16 The awesome
breadth of Professor Farber's scholarly agenda is reminiscent of
historian David Christian's argument "that the appropriate time
scale for the study of history may be the whole of time."17
Professor Farber's very career presents a compelling case for "big
law," for the proposition that the substantive scale on which law
should be studied, taught, and learned is the entirety of human
experience.
This Symposium, The Pragmatic Ecologist: Environmental
Protection as a Jurisdynamic Experience, represents a first step
toward reconceptualizing environmental law as an integral
component of a comprehensive, dynamic approach to the biggest
questions in law. The contributors to this Symposium are at once
deep in the expertise they bring to bear upon this subject and
broad in the viewpoints they express. On November 1 and 2,
12. J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 885, 894 (2003).
13. See Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367, 377
(1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917
(1986).
14. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 2003).
15. Compare DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998), with ROGER W. FINDLEY &
DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (5th ed.
1999).
16. Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir.
1943).
17. David Christian, The Case for "Big History," 2 J. WORLD HIST. 223, 223
(1991).
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2002, five of the contributors-J.B. Ruhl, Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Christopher H. Schroeder, A. Dan Tarlock, and Amy
Wildermuth-presented their papers at the University of
Minnesota Law School. Jamie A. Grodsky, Lisa Heinzerling, and
Richard A. Duncan provided commentary and moderated
audience discussion. Three other contributors-Douglas A.
Kysar, Richard J. Lazarus, and James E. Salzman--did not
attend the conference but have enriched this Symposium from
afar. All of these scholars have done their best to engage
Professor Farber's pragmatic, dynamic vision of environmental
protection with "[i]magination, detachment, and humor."' 8 At
the same time, the Symposium appeals to the full range of
perspectives within environmental law. To borrow Christopher
Schroeder's tripartite division of environmental advocates, 19
"prophets," "priests," and "pragmatists" will all find some
comfort-and some distress-within the pages of this journal.
Finally, some words of thanks are overdue. The editors and
staff of the Minnesota Law Review have been extraordinarily
gracious in their handling of this Symposium. Without the
financial support of the University of Minnesota Law School and
the University's Consortium on Law and Values in Health,
Environment, & the Life Sciences, neither this Symposium nor
the conference from which it emerged could have taken place.
Two deans of the Law School, E. Thomas Sullivan and Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., supported this enterprise during a time of decanal
transition. Most indispensable were my tirelessly dedicated
assistants-Kelly Wolford, Marcie Cornfield, Melissa Listug
Klick, Nicole Narotzky, and Elizabeth Steblay. And of course, I
thank Dan Farber for the intellectual stimulation, professional
inspiration, and profound friendship he has shown me over the
last decade.
18. Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 147, 171 (1994).
19. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1065 (2003).
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